#consciousness

Wiki 6

• Hard Problem of Consciousness David Chalmers' 1994 framing of consciousness as having two distinct problems, and Rovelli's case that the "hard" problem is a category error
• Moral Agency vs Moral Patienthood The distinction between something owed moral consideration and something accountable for its actions, applied to LLMs — Chiang's claim that a software agent can be neither
• No, AI Is Not Conscious (Ted Chiang) Chiang argues LLMs are sentence-continuation machines with no subjective experience, so they can be neither conscious nor moral agents
• Philosophical Zombies Chalmers' thought experiment of a being physically identical to a human but without inner experience, and Rovelli's self-defeat objection
• Ted Chiang Science-fiction writer and essayist; recurring critic of LLM hype and anthropomorphism for The New Yorker and The Atlantic
• There Is No Hard Problem of Consciousness Carlo Rovelli's argument that Chalmers' "hard problem" smuggles in dualism upfront; the soul is part of nature, not separate from it